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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\YElL\ T. C.c\LLISTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent) 
v. 
Lt·ry C. CALLISTER, Individually 
and as Executrix of the Estate of 
. \ lf'red Cyril Callister, Deceased, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10013 
ST .:\.TE)IEXT OF KIND OF CASE 
This was an action to set aside a release, stipulation, 
and judgment (resulting from compromise and settle-
ment of a prior action) and to recover, along with 
~:.?5,000.00 punitive damages, the full amount demanded 
in the prior action less $4,000.00 paid to settle it. The 
complaint alleges that defendant's fraudulent represen-
tations had induced plaintiff to settle. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, and both parties moved for summary judgment. 
The court granted plaintiff's motion, holding as a mat-
ter of law that plaintiff was entitled to have the prior 
stipulation, judgment, and release set aside. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment andre-
mand of the case with direction to dismiss the action with 
prejudice; or, if this is denied, remand of the case to 
the district court for trial of issues relating to the claimed 
fraud, and to reliance, estoppel, clean hands, and plain-
tiff's timeliness. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Vera T. Callister (herein called "Vera") 
was once married to Dr. Alfred Cyril Callister (herein 
called "Dr. Callister"), now deceased. On July 30, 1945, 
they were divorced ( R. I) , and Dr. Callister was ordered 
to pay monthly alimony. As of early 1955, Dr. Callister's 
alimony payments were current, but in that year some 
payments were missed and at Dr. Callister's death on 
February 9, 1961, there had accrued under the terms 
of the decree a principal indebtedness of $11,150.00 
(R. 40). 
Subsequent to his divorce, Dr. Callister married 
defendant, Lucy C. Callister (herein called "Lucy"), 
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nnd their rnarriage continued until Dr. Callister died. 
Lut•y was appointed executrix, letters testamentary 
W<'rc issued, and she qualified on or about :\larch 2-J., 
19tl 1 (H. 78). She has acted as executrix ever since. 
On about .August 7, 1961, Lucy as executrix de-
livered to the clerk of the court an "Inventory and 
. \ ppraismenf' of the probate estate, along with an "In-
heritallcc Tax Report and r\ppraisment," completed 
except for Yaluations by appraisers (R. 85, 100). The 
probate in Yen tory showed an estate of only $809.12, but 
the companion inheritance tax report showed that less 
than three years before his death Dr. Callister had trans-
ferred a large nun1ber of shares of stock, and that when 
he died Dr. Callister and Lucy held a joint tenancy in 
two Yaluable parcels of local real property. The probate 
appraisal was filed officially on August 24, 1961 (R. 
s.;). and the inheritance tax appraisal was filed officially 
on February 9, 1962 (R. 100-103). 
~Ieanwhile, in June, 1961, Yera's counsel had filed 
a clain1 against the estate for $11,400.00 alimony, and 
~:?.046.:28 interest, and on ~ ovember 1, 1961, the claim 
was rejected (R. 87-89). On November 8, 1961, James 
'""· Beless, Jr., then , ... era's only attorney of record, 
filed suit against Lucy to establish Y' era's claim against 
the estate and, in effect, to set aside the transfers to 
Lucy by Dr. Callister (R. 21-26), the complaint alleg-
ing that the transfers were made "without consideration 
and with intent to hinder, delay and defraud plaintiff as 
a creditor," and that Lucy aided and abetted Dr. Cal-
lister in his fraudulent scheme. Lucy's answer admitted 
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the transfers, denied they were fraudulent within the 
meaning of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act (Title 25, 
Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953), and raised 
defenses of laches and estoppel, on the ground that Vera 
had led Dr. Callister to believe she would not collect the 
alimony, and that as a result Dr. Callister, who then 
had grounds for reduction of alimony, failed to obtain 
modification of the decree. 
When the first action was brought, Vera's attorney 
knew there was a conflict of interest between Lucy and 
Vera, and that Lucy claimed the right to keep the prop-
erty transferred to her by Dr. Callister (R. 21-23, 
52 :4-5) .1 He also knew there was no actual confidential 
relationship between the two women and that there had 
been ill feeling between them for many years (R. 52: 
28-29). He was experienced in probate _matters and 
knew that Lucy, at the same time she was defending 
a fraudulent conveyance action, would have to anticipate 
that the tax collectors would claim that Dr. Callister 
made the transfers "in contemplation of death" (R. 52: 
10-11) .2 
The fact of the transfers was never kept from Vera; 
information about them was contained in the inheritance 
1 As the record has been put together, each deposition is given 
a separate page number. For convenience, depositions will be 
referred to by the record page number followed by the page 
number in the deposition, e.g., R. 52: 4-5 refers to pages 4 and 
5 of the deposition of James W. Beless, Jr., and Vera T. Callister, 
found at page 52 of the record. 
2 Although Vera's counsel doesn't say so directly, his testimony 
has to mean that he believed the existence of the tax problem 
would help him force a settlement of the fraudulent conveyances 
action (R. 52: 11, 57a). 
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tux report and probate inventory which had been 
cxnmincd by .Jlr. lleless prior to bringing the action 
\H. :;:! :~l-10). .. \ llegations about the transfers of the 
property and the fraudulent intentions of Dr. Callister 
and Luey in Inaking the1n, in fact, comprised the bulk 
of the cmnplaint in the first fraud action. 
In preparing for trial of the first action Yera's 
l'otmsel took Lucy's deposition and served interroga-
tories upon her. During the deposition Vera's counsel 
began to inquire about the stock transfers and the 
reasons for them: 
"(~. (By ~Ir. Beless) Why were the transfers 
of the stock made in 1959 from your husband 
to you? 
.A .. I didn't know they were made until after 
they had been made and 111y husband told me he 
thought it was best to put them in my name. 
Q. '\Then did you find out they had been made? 
... \. I don't think it was until in 1960 sometime. 
Q. Did the dividends come in your name? 
~\.. l~ es they did" (R. 59 :15). 
But he abandoned the inquiry for no apparent 
reason and asked no more questions in the deposition 
or subsequent interrogatories (R. 31) about where or 
when conversations occurred; how Lucy learned of the 
transfers: or Dr. Callister's reasons for thinking "it was 
best" to put then1 in Lucy's name. He made no effort 
to interview other persons who might have knowledge 
of Dr. Callister's affairs because "they were all hostile" 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 52:18). But, notwithstanding the "representations" 
in Lucy's inventories, answer to the complaint, deposi-
tion and answers to interrogatories, Vera moved for-
ward with the action. On April 23, 1962, her counsel 
served and filed a "Notice of Readiness for Trial" (R. 
39) in which he certified that he had interviewed all 
known witnesses he might call, used such discovery as 
he felt necessary, and concluded all necessary examina-
tions and depositions. On September 26, 1962, a pre-trial 
conference was held by the court. 
The Pre-Trial Order (R. 40-42) framed the fol-
lowing issues: whether in making the transfers Dr. Cal-
lister had an intent "presumed in law" to defraud his 
creditors; whether he was rendered insolvent; and 
whether Vera was estopped from asserting her claim 
against the estate. All pleadings were merged in the 
order, the effect of which was to eliminate from the case 
any issue as to whether Dr. Callister had the "actual 
intent" to defraud creditors (R. 40-42). 
The order impressed Vera's counsel with the "dif-
ficulties" in his case (R. 52:26), and regenerated 
thoughts of settlement. He returned to his office to write 
a long, analytic letter to Lucy's counsel, suggesting that 
Lucy, by paying Vera's claim, could save the difference 
between the amount of that claim and death taxes which 
might be imposed. (The letter is found at R. 52:57a, 
and is reprinted as Appendix "A" to this brief.) 
Although counsel's calculations were erroneous--over-
stating the tax-the implications were clear. He rec-
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ognized that \'era's claim of "fraudulent conveyance" 
was inconsistent with the anticipated Tax Commission 
cluim that the transfers were includable for estate tax 
purposes because made "in contemplation of death." 
Payment to Yera would help convince the tax authorities 
thut Dr. Callister's intent was to place the property 
beyond access of his former wife.3 
l t had been pointed out by Lucy's counsel that the 
court could find the transfers were made to defraud 
\'era as a creditor, while the taxing authorities could 
find that the transfers were "in contemplation of death"; 
ulso, that Lucy possibly could prevail in both cases (R. 
52:20). 
X egotiations opened by the Beless letter of Sep-
tember 26, culminated in compromise: Lucy was to 
pay $4,000.00 to \'"era in complete settlement of all her 
clain1s against Lucy, individually and as executrix. 
The money was paid and a release executed and 
delivered by y· era. On October 10, 1962 (the date set 
for trial), the parties entered into a stipulation that the 
action be "distnissed with prejudice and on the merits," 
and on October 11 the following judgment was entered: 
"l ... pon stipulation of the parties, and it appear-
ing that the above entitled action has been fully 
compromised and settled, it is ORDERED, 
3 H. as counsel contends (R. 52: 16) ), he then believed Lucy's 
denial of actual fraudulent intent, the letter was in effect asking 
her to commit a fraud on the tax authorities by leading them to 
believe that the transfers were made with intent to defraud 
Vera. and not in contemplation of death. If he didn't believe it 
there was no reliance at the time of settlement. ' 
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ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the 
above entiled action be, and it hereby is, dismissed 
with prejudice and on the merits, each party to 
bear her own costs." 
As anticipated by all, the taxability of the transfers 
became an issue, and in December Lucy presented to 
the State Tax Commission three affidavits relating to 
Dr. Callister's state of mind. Two affidavits from attor-
neys tended to show that Dr. Callister was concerned 
about his former wife's claim for alimony; the third, 
Lucy's own, contained a statement that Dr. Callister 
had once said (the date not being indica ted) that he had 
made the transfers fqr the purpose of putting the prop-
erty "beyond access of his former wife." A copy of 
Lucy's affidavit is found at R. 51 and in this brief as 
Appendix "B." 
The Tax Commission did not accept the affidavits 
as conclusive as to intent and continued to claim the 
right to death taxes on the transfers. A compromise 
and settlement was stipulated between Lucy and the 
Tax Commission on July 12, 1963, under which Lucy 
paid the Tax Commission $4,286.61 in estate taxes (R. 
129), representing one-half of the amount that would 
have been payable if all of the transfers had been in-
cluded in the gross estate. Thus Lucy had compromised 
two claims against her, both of which were based in large 
part, if not entirely, upon different, inconsistent states 
of mind on the part of Dr. Callister-who was no longer 
available to testify. 
In March or April, 1963, Vera's lawyer learned of 
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Luey's atl'id:n·it (R. 5~::!1, i8), but did nothing about 
it "hceause frankly I wanted to see what the Tax Com-
mission did on this conflicting evidence," even though 
he knew I .uey was then attempting to resolve the tax 
dispute (H. ;)i:i7). At that 1noment Yera's counsel had 
all the inforn1ation he later felt to be necessary to sup-
port rT:-.l·ission of the settlement, but took no action with 
respect to rescission until August 27, when the present 
complaint was filed (R. 1-6). It was Vera's lawyer who 
told Y era of the affidaYit and advocated the bringing 
of a second action (R. 52:28, 50). 
For the purpose of this proceeding, the averments 
of' the emu plaint are of little help; but the depositions 
of .Jan1es \\r. Beless, Jr., and 'rera, and 'rera's affidavit, 
spell out what conduct Y era claims to have been fraudu-
lent. Compare the following excerpts: 
(1) From 'rera's affidavit (R. 49-50): 
"*** The above quoted facts (from Lucy's 
affidaYit) were the Yery facts alleged by me to 
be true in the assertion of a claim in the estate of 
Dr. A. Cyril Callister, deceased, in the probate 
of which defendant was executrix and also in an 
action against defendant when said claim was 
denied. Defendant denied the truth of my allega-
tions in the probate and in the action, but after 
I reduced 1ny claim and compromised it and gave 
defendant a release based upon this denial, defen-
dant filed the attached affidaYit with the Tax 
C onrn1ission asserting the very things I had pre-
Yiously alleged and she had denied. 
'·In settling the action brought by me to estab-
lish my claim I relied on the denial by defendant 
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of Dr. Callister's intent to place them beyond 
my access, which denials were contained in her 
pleadings, deposition, and also in documents 
on file in the probate of Dr. Callister's estate. 
"Had the defendant disclosed to me the above 
quoted facts which were known to her and which 
she, as executrix, had the duty to do, I would 
not have settled my claim for anything less than 
the full amount due plus interest." 
(2) Vera's deposition (R. 52): 
"We settled for that $4,000.00 because I 
thought there was no other chance of getting it, 
to be exact, no other opportunity to get it" 
(R. 52 :42). 
* * * 
A. I think I relied on my lawyer. If he had 
suggested that there was no chance of getting 
anything out of that debt that he owed me, I 
would have dropped it, yes. 
Q. But your decision would have been based 
upon his judgment as to the probable outcome of 
the suit? 
A. Well you usually do the thing that your 
lawyer thinks best" (R. 52:42). 
* * * 
"Q. Is it fair to assume then that the reason 
you settled the prior action was that your lawyer 
advised you that it was probably best to settle it? 
A. Well he made me see that it was best" (R. 
52:43). 
* * * 
"A. Yes, she was disputing it and I figured if 
$4,000 was all I could get from what was owed 
10 
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me. it was better to take that than to be pigheaded 
und not take anything. 
Q. This was by way of a settlement of that 
suit? 
.A. Yes. 
Q. You knew that she was paying you some 
tnoney that she didn't concede was due to you 
either 1 
~ \. '\rhy wouldn't she think it was due to me? 
Q. She had been saying this all through the 
lawsuit, hadn't she? 
.A. Yes, I guess she had-that she paid me, that 
it came from her and not from the estate, the 
$4,000? 
Q. That is correct. You knew that it came from 
her, didn't you? 
A. Yes, if she put it that way" (R. 52:44). 
* * * 
"A. *** I settled it for that $4,000 strictly 
on the advice of my lawyer, that it was the best 
thing to do. *** Yes. We might have had nothing 
at all if we would have gone to court about it 
as far as I know" (R. 52:51). 
* * * 
"Q. Notwithstanding this affidavit, Mrs. Cal-
lister. you would probably have settled for $4,000 
even then if you had been advised by counsel that 
you should do so? 
... -\.. 'Yell I think it's wise to take the opinion of 
counsel ( R. 52 :54) . 
11 
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From the foregoing excerpts it is clear that Vera 
settled the case on the advice of counsel. The following 
quotations from the deposition of J. W. Beless, Jr., 
make it equally clear that his advice was given not 
because of any belief in anything Lucy had told 
him or concealed from him, but upon his professional 
judgment that it would be difficult to prove a fraudulent 
conveyance by Dr. Callister: 
Q. So that (prior to bringing the first action) 
you would be able to tell from examining those 
two documents that although the probate inven-
tory listed assets of approximately $800.00, the 
inventory for tax purposes listed assets in excess 
of One Hundred Thousand Dollars? 
A. That is correct, and I had checked the record 
as to the real property owned by Dr. Callister 
and I had determined that there were two parcels 
owned by him and Lucy Callister as joint 
tenants" (R. 52:10). 
* * * 
"Q. When you say you felt you had a good 
lawsuit, you are speaking as of September 26, 
1962? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. When did you change your mind about 
that? 
A. I believe that I would say this: Shortly 
after the pre-trial conference before Judge 
Ellett. You possibly have the date of that there 
in your file. 
Q. Yes, the pre-trial conference is dated Sep-
tember 26, 1962. 
12 
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..:\ .. At that tin1e I was faced with proving one 
of two things: One, that Dr. Callister was made 
insolvent by these transfers; two, that Dr. Cal-
lister intentionally made these transfers to aYoid 
this creditor. 
1\t that time I had taken the deposition of 
Lucy Callister and I knew that I was faced with 
little proof as to his actual intent. *** 
Q. So that you were faced with the problem 
of proof on the achJ_al intent? 
A. I was, and at that time I did considerable 
research and my finding was that there was some 
lTtah law in my favor but there was considerable 
law on the matter of insolvency which was de-
finitely against me. And at that time, immediately 
after this letter, I conferred with you regarding 
the possibility of a settlement. 
Q. That is right, you brought it up, didn't you? 
A. I think this letter probably was the initiation 
of that settlement. There had been offers before 
that time. You had offered back in August of 
1961 to settle it" (R. 52:12-13). 
* * * 
"Q. Forming your professional judgment as 
to the difficulties of proof of Dr. Callister's 
actual intent, I suppose you were aware of and 
somewhat concerned with the fact that communi-
cations from Dr. Callister to his then wife would 
be privileged? 
A. Yes, I was very much concerned with that. 
In fact this 'll'as why I felt that my only possibility 
tL·as in either a presumption in law of intent~ or 
in a possibility of the law being construed as to 
13 
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this matter of insolvency~~ (R. 52:14). (Emphasis 
added.) 
* * * 
"Q. Going back to the period starting with the 
initiation of the first action inN ovember of 1961 
and its settlement in 1962, I believe it was 
October, had Lucy Callister made any represen-
tations to you that changed your mind about the 
allegations as to the attempt to defraud that you 
had made in the complaint? 
A. I think she had in this respect: Certainly 
her pleadings had specifically denied the intent 
of Dr. Callister and had denied her knowledge in 
the part where I allege she aided and abetted him 
in these transfers. And also when I took her depo-
sition she stated specifically, in answer to my 
question as to whether she was familiar with her 
answer to my complaint, that she was. She also 
was acting as executrix here and I think that by 
the nature of her two inventories she made a rep-
resentation here upon which we definitely relied. 
*** 
I think that the representations that were made 
to me by Lucy Callister were her pleadings, the 
probate and inheritance tax inventories, and her 
reaffirmation of the effect of those in her deposi-
tion. 
Q. Did you believe her when she said that these 
transfers weren't made for the intent of defraud-
ing Vera? 
A. I think after she made her reaffirmation in 
her deposition I did" (R. 52:15-17). 
* * * 
14 
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Q. So you don't know specifically of any cmn-
munications that would have been made to 
( Lu('y) strictly in her capacity as executrix that 
she hasn't disclosed 1 *** 
.A. I ha,·e no other information respecting his 
atl'airs. I can only rely on what was filed. 
(~. 'Vhat this reliance of yours boils down to 
is that if ~Irs. Callister had told you of communi-
cations from her husband which would have been 
usable against her and which you had concluded 
would be sufficient to win the case for you, you 
wouldn't have settled it? 
A. I certainly would not have. 
Q. But other than the things she told you about 
the case in answer to questions in depositions 
and interrogatories, she never made any com-
munications to you or directed any to you that 
kept you from going about your work to find out 
what the case was all about, did she? 
A. No, I had no communication with her. 
Q. That is right, so that you were free to go 
ahead and have your day in court? 
A. That is correct. *** 
Q. One thing I haven't got clear, you may have 
answered it, but I beheve you said up until Sep-
tenlber 26 when you wrote the letter to me you 
believed you had a good lawsuit?*** Now what 
happened on that day which altered your judg-
ment about the worth of the lawsuit? 
A. I think Judge Ellett spelled out very clearly 
my difficulties in his pre-trial order" (R. 52:25-
26}. 
Yera kept the $4,000.00 (R. 52 :-:t4). Letting Vera 
ha,-e her cake and eat it must have concerned the trial 
15 
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judge, for in setting aside the judgment and release he 
directed 'T era to pay $4,000.00 plus interest into the 
court, its disposition to await further order (R. 62). 
On the basis of the depositions, Vera's affidavit, 
and the file in the previous case, the court ruled that 
the judgment should be set aside, for the following 
reasons: 
"*** Lucy Callister as administratrix of the 
estate of Cyril Callister had a duty to marshal 
the assets and to recover all property transferred 
in fraud of creditors; that this duty as a court 
officer came ahead of any right that she might 
have had as an heir or as a transferee; that it 
appears she had a conflict of interest at the time; 
that since she was in possession of information 
that would have tended to have brought assets 
in the estate and by failing to resign, she has 
placed creditors in a position that they would not 
have been in if she had been attempting to mar-
shal all the assets that could come into the estate; 
and that it appears to the court that this plaintiff 
in making the settlement did so without full 
knowledge of all of the information possessed 
by the administratrix at the time of the settle-
ment" ( R. 53-54) . 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF ANY 
EVIDENCE OF FRAUD ON THE PART 
OF DEFENDANT. 
16 
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The l T nifurn1 Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 
udopted in Utah as Title ~5, Chapter 1, Utah Code 
• \nnotated 1953, pern1its creditors to set aside certain 
l'Oil\·eyances by their debtors. In 25-1-4 U.C.A. 1953 
there is a provision that transfers which render a person 
insolvent, or which are made when he is insolvent, are 
fmudulent as to his creditors; and under 25-1-7 convey-
ances made and obligations incurred "with actual intent, 
as distinguished from intent presumed in law," to hinder, 
delay or defraud present or future creditors are fraudu-
lent as to them. 
\r era's complaint in the original action alleged both 
of the statutory grounds for setting aside conveyances 
made by Dr. Callister, but Vera's counsel conceived 
some difficulty in establishing "constructive" fraud be-
cause Dr. Callister retained a joint tenancy interest in 
real property which greatly exceeded his indebtedness. 
Aetual fraudulent intent was pleaded, even though 
Y era's counsel had no information supporting such an 
allegation (R. 52:8) .4 
Apart frmn the question of constructive fraud aris-
ing fron1 insolvency, the complaint and answer put in 
issue the purpose-the state of mind-of Dr. Callister, 
since deceased, at the time he transferred some stocks 
in 1959. 
It is con1mon knowledge that when an owner of 
property transfers it he may be motivated by a number 
of factors, no one of which represents the reason for the 
4 Does this violation of Rule 11 constitute "fraud"? 
17 
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transfer. To reconstruct the specific intent of a deceased 
person it is usually necessary to rely upon circumstan-
tial evidence, since the transactions are not often ac-
companied by declarations of intent and, when they are, 
the declarations may not be true. The greater worth of 
circumstantial evidence has been recognized in the cases. 
See 37 C.J.S., Fraudulent Conveyances~ §422, p. 1267 
et seq: 
"*** Fraudulent intent may be established by 
proof of facts and circumstances from which suc.h 
an inference may reasonably be drawn, such as 
the deed, the acts of the parties, and the surround-
ing circumstances, and it need not necessarily be 
proved as an independent fact; but all of the 
circumstances proved must be considered to-
gether.*** 
'"'"Weight of direct testim,ony. Fraudulent in-
tent may be inferred from the acts done and the 
surrounding circumstances, which must be taken 
into consideration, notwithstanding the party 
making the transfer denies fraudulent intent. 
While it has been held that the fact of the testi-
mony of one of the defendants who was a party 
to the conveyance which tends to show that it was 
without fraudulent intent, is not believable is not 
a circumstance from which such intent can be 
found, it has also been held that fraud may be 
established from the intrinsic improbability of, 
or contradictions in, the testimony denying fraud; 
and, where the testimony relied on show good 
faith in the making of a transfer is given by inter-
ested relatives only, the reasonableness or un-
reasonableness of their evidence has considerable 
weight." 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is clear that in the first action Y' era had access 
tu eit'l'ttmstantial proof and was not dependent upon 
obtaining f'rmn Lucy a report of communications be-
tween Dr. Callister and Lucy before he died; and if she 
hnd learned of con1munications between husband and 
wit'~. there is serious doubt whether the information 
could have helped her in the trial of her case. The state-
nwnt referred to in Lucy's affidavit to the Tax COin-
mission was probably privileged under the provisions of 
iH-~4-8 U.C .. A .. 1953, since the privilege continues to 
exist though the 1narriage has ended by divorce or death . 
. \nd if. for smne reason, it were held that the privilege 
did not apply, still it is doubtful that a statement made 
hy Dr. Callister subsequent to the transfers (R. 54-55) 
would be admissible in evidence against Lucy. See two 
annotations relating to admissibility of statements of a 
transferror in an action against a transferee in 64 
A.L.R. 797 and 83 A.L.R. 1446. 
The affirmative representations upon which Vera 
clai1ns to haYe relied are described by her counsel as "her 
pleadings, the probate and inheritance tax inventories, 
and her reaffirmation of the effect of those in her deposi-
tion" (R. 52 :17). 
The pleadings aren"'t fraudulent. Lucy presently 
contends and has contended all along that the transfers 
weren't made with intent to defraud Vera. The evidence 
was such that a trier-of-fact could find that the transfers 
were n1ade "in contemplation of death," or for the pur-
pose of' seeing that the parties' young son was cared for, 
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or out of gratitude. Denial of averments of fraudulent 
intent was based upon more substantial evidence than 
the averments themselves. There was good ground to 
support the answer and it was properly entered under 
Rule 11, notwithstanding there might have been some 
evidence supporting the complaint.5 Under Vera's theory 
every litigant who lost a fact issue would be fraudulent 
ab initio. 
The inventories aren~t fraudulent. They show on 
their face that the transfers were made and that Lucy 
doesn't consider the property to be part of the estate. 
There is no contention that the property wasn~t trans-
ferred. Fraudulent conveyances are voidable, not void. 
Moreover, these ''representations'' were made before the 
first case was filed, so there couldn't have been any 
reliance upon them. 
The deposition isn~t fraudulent. We have searched 
in vain for Lucy's "reaffirmation of the effect of those" 
(R. 52 :17). Vera's counsel had the opportunity to cross-
examine Lucy at length about the transfers but didn't 
do it. Her deposition contains no statements inconsistent 
with her later statements or her later conduct. Perforce, 
Vera's counsel "had to rely on the general tone of her 
deposition" (R. 52:18). 
Inasmuch as there were no actionable misrepresen-
tations, the only thing left is a failure to disclose. The 
5 Judge Ellett's order reinstated the fraudulent conveyance issue 
as one to be tried. Does Lucy now have a duty to amend her 
answer and admit the conveyances were made with intent to 
defraud Vera, i.e., confess judgment? Is her failure to do so 
fraudulent? 
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trinl court took the view that Lucy had a duty to tell 
r era about a post-transfer, out-of-court declaration 
made by Dr. Callister. This is not the law with respect 
to litigants generally. 
There aren't very many cases in which it has been 
argued that one litigant has a duty voluntarily6 to dis-
l'lost' to his adversary the existence or source of evidence 
helpful to the adversary's case. Whe!l the argument has 
been made, it has generally been rejected. The question 
was considered by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in 
two early cases, Mills" Heirs v. Lee_, 22 Ky. 91, 17 
Am. Dec. 118, and Taylor v. Bradshaw_, 22 Ky. 146, 
Ii Am. Dec. 132. The Mills" Heirs case arose out of 
an action between claimants to real property, which 
action had been compromised by Mills with Lee and 
Graham. After 1\tlills's death, his heirs sought to set 
aside the compromise on the ground that at the time 
of the settletnent Lee and Graham had known of an 
entry in the land records that tended to prove their 
clain1s invalid. The court held that failure to disclose the 
entry was not fraudulent concealment, saying: 
"The compromise of a doubtful claim cannot 
be set aside, but for fraudulent misrepresentation 
of facts, or fraudulent concealment of facts, or 
such imposition otherwise as amounts to uncon-
scientious and unfair dealing. 
6 In discussing the duty to disclose evidence, we have inserted 
the word "voluntarily" although it it is not generally used by the 
cc;)Urts. We have done so in. recog~ition of the. right to compel 
disclosures by means of various discovery devices provided for 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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"'V e say fraudulent concealment of facts, be-
cause a concealment of that which a party was not 
bound to disclose, would not be ground for avoid-
ing a compromise. Suppose Lee and Graham had 
known that these warrants had been assigned 
away after the survey of 1784 had been executed, 
and that other lands had been surveyed in 1785, 
and believed, as they state, that those .assignments 
had been illegally and surreptitiously made, were 
they bound as suitors in court, upon a treaty of 
compromise, to have disclosed the facts to their 
adversary, to strengthen his defense in case no 
compromise was effected. To say that they were, 
would be to lay down a rule too refined for the 
common sense and understanding of upright 
men. It would, in effect, prescribe to those in a 
treaty for a compromise of doubtful conflicting 
claims, the duty to disclose the weaknesses, doubts 
and difficulties of their respective claims and dis-
courage all compromises. 
"***In the present case the end and aim of the 
parties in contracting and compromising an exist-
ing suit was to avoid the hazard and expense of 
litigation. No reasonable man ought to expect in 
such communication that the one party or the 
other is bound to mutual disclosure of the means 
of attack and defense in case the compromise does 
not succeed. Such a rule would forbid all attempts 
at compromise." 
Taylor v. Bradshaw involved an occupier's claim 
for improvements in an ejectment action. Commissioners 
fixed the amount to be allowed but thereafter an equi-
table action was brought for relief from the judgment 
on the ground that the occupier ha~ fraudulently con-
cealed facts showing that he had no color of title and was 
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not an ··mTu pying clai1nant." In denying relief the court 
said: 
"*** It would be going further than we have 
any recollection of any court having gone, and 
further than any court ought to go to fix upon 
Bradshaw the commission of fraud, merely be-
cause he did not disclose to his adversary all the 
circun1stances within his knowledge that might 
tend to weaken his claim or defeat his recovery . 
••• 
''Frmn those who have reason to expect infor-
mation fron1 us the truth should not be withheld, 
but such as look not to us for information and 
expect no disclosure from us, have no cause to 
cmnplain of our silence, and to reproach us for 
not speaking with having suppressed the truth. 
"By the act of Bradshaw's asserting claims for 
improvements the appellants were admonished 
not to expect from him a disclosure of any which 
would prove he was not entitled to the benefits 
of the occupying claimant's law, and it would be 
preposterous to suppose that they were deluded 
and deceived by any failure of his, in not disclos-
ing to them evidence which might defeat his 
claim." 
\Yhen Lucy claimed the right to property trans-
ferred by Dr. Callister and denied 'r era's claim against 
the estate, Y era was admonished not to expect from 
Lucy a disclosure of anything which would tend to 
proye that the conveyances were fraudulent, and it would 
be preposterous to suppose that she was deluded and 
deceiYed by any failure to disclose to Vera evidence 
which n1ight help establish her claim. The aim of the 
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negotiations was to compromise and settle a disputed 
claim, and it would have been unreasonable for Vera or 
her counsel to expect that Lucy would make known to 
them evidence which might be used by them to her detri-
ment if a compromise were not agreed upon. 
Indeed, the depositions of Vera and her lawyer 
clearly show that there was no "reliance" on any fact 
as "true," but only a professional judgment by Vera's 
lawyer that a pigeon in the hand was better than a golden 
eagle in the bush. Since Vera relied on this judgment, 
she cannot now claim she relied on Lucy's honorable 
intentions toward her. See Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 
351, 23 Pac. 16, 16 Am.St.Rep. 137, in which the Su-
preme Court of California said: 
"Whatever may have been said as to the pre-
sumptions arising out of proof of a fiduciary 
relation, the fundamental principle upon which 
rescission is granted is always, and under all cir-
cumstances, the claim and consideration that 
confidence has been reposed, and that confidence 
has been abused. No such claim can in reason be 
made where the party seeking rescission-being 
of competent age and understanding, and acting 
only in his own interest-has undertaken to in-
vestigate for himself, called in experts, been given 
free and fair means of ascertaining the truth, 
acted upon his own judgment and the advice of 
friends, and repudiated any confidence in or 
reliance upon the parties within whom he was 
dealing. It matters not what the relations of the 
parties have been prior to, or are at the time of, 
the negotiations for a settlement and compromise 
of their disputes, the principle is one of universal 
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application, and it is a principle of common sense 
and of good policy.*** 
"*** If, at the time of the purchase or com-
promise, the trustee has shaken off his fiduciary 
character, and the confidence which is presumed 
to result therefrom, it matters not what has oc-
curred immediately preceding or long prior to 
the final transaction. In other words, if the trans-
action is one in which the trustee may lawfully 
deal with the cestui que trust by first dissolving 
the trust relation, it is not too late for him to do 
so at any time before the cestui que trust is pre-
vented from making a full and fair investigation 
in consideration of the business in hand, and be-
fore he executes the contract.*** 
"Under such circumstances, is plaintiff entitled 
to a rescission of the contract thus deliberately 
entered into 1 We think she is not. Her counsel 
claims there was actual and constructive fraud. 
*** They say that defendants furnished a list 
of the assets of the Western Development Com.: 
pany; that this was equivalent to a positive asser-
tion that the list contained all of the assets-an 
assertion not true, not warranted by the infor-
mation of the parties making it, and therefore 
fraudulent, although they believed it to be true; 
*** but the rule as stated is not, upon authority 
or principle, applicable where such party, dis-
carding the representation as unworthy of belief, 
proceeds to inquire for himself, is given full and 
fair facilities of informing himself, takes indepen-
dent counsel, and :finally acts upon his own judg-
ment and that of his advisors. Misrepresentations 
cannot be predicated upon such a state of facts." 
As pointed out hereinafter, there is respectable 
authority that Lucy never occupied a fiduciary position 
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with respect to Vera; but if she ever did, the relationship 
was terminated when Vera renounced it, made a claim 
against the estate, retained counsel, and brought suit 
against Lucy, as executrix and individually, claiming 
that Lucy and her late husband had conspired to defraud 
Vera as a creditor, and that Lucy's individual property 
was subject to her claim. 
"The essence of the test is whether or not under all 
of the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks 
of an arm's length bargain." Pepper v. Litton .. 308 U.S. 
295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281. The transaction be-
tween Lucy and Vera was at arm's length, through 
counsel, and Lucy had no duty to disclose facts that 
might weaken her case. Thompson v. J(ansas City C.C. 
and St. J. Ry. Co ... 224 Mo. App. 415, 27 S.W.2d 58; 
and Western Grain Company Cases .. 264 Ala. 145, 85 
So.2d 395, containing a lengthy analysis of various fidu-
ciary relationships and the duties of disclosure arising 
out of them. 
In the first action-as in this one-Vera and Lucy 
were antagonistic adversaries/ Vera didn't rely on Lucy 
to pay her claim, or to do anything for her, but employed 
counsel and set about to establish a claim to reach Lucy's 
property. Actionable fraud requires a misrepresentation 
or fraudulent concealment of a material fact and -
among other things-reliance by the party claiming 
fraud. Oberg v. Sanders .. Ill Utah 407, 184 P.2d 229; 
Pace v. Parrish et al., 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273. 
ftiiW_ 
7 If the parties A wished to compromise and settle, could Lucy 
do so with any assurance ~finality? She is still executrix. 
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l" ruler all the fads and circtunstances, not only was 
the t·ourt not justified in finding fraud, it was required 
to tind that there wasn't any fraud. 
II 
TilE FlL\CD RELIED UPON BY 
PL.\IXTIFF, IF THERE 'VAS ANY, IS 
lXSUFFICIENT IN LA'V TO JUSTIFY 
THE TRI~\L COURT IN SETTING ASIDE 
... \ .JC"D(~~IENT, .AND THE DEFENDANT 
IS EXTITLED TO .A DISMISSAL AS A 
~lATTER OF LAW. 
The fraud clain1ed by '-r era as the basis for setting 
nside the prior judgment relates directly to a factual 
issue in the prior action, viz., the actual intent of Dr. 
Callister when he transferred property to Lucy; and 
this court has recently ruled upon the type of fraud 
which n1ust be present to justify setting aside a judg-
ment. In Haner 1'. Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 
.>77, a motion had been made to have a judgment set 
aside, one of the grounds being that the defendant had 
made false representations in procuring the judgment. 
Denial of the motion was affirmed, the court saying: 
"***Inasmuch as the plaintiff here seems to 
be relying on the ground of fraud, there is a dis-
tinction which it is necessary to point out. In 
order to justify granting relief, the alleged wrong 
would have to be of the type characterized as 
extrinsic fraud: That is, fraud based on conduct 
or activities outside the court proceedings them-
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
selves; and which is designed and has the effect 
of depriving the other party of the opportunity 
to present his claim or defense. This type of 
fraud, which is regarded as a fraud not only upon 
the opponent, but upon the court itself, can be 
accomplished in a number of ways, such as making 
false statements or representations to the other 
party or to witnesses to prevent them from con-
testing the issues ; or by that means or otherwise 
preventing the attendance of the parties or wit-
nesses ; or by destroying or secreting evidence; 
so that a fair trial of the issues is effectively pre-
vented. 
"It is obvious that quite a different situation 
exists where there is no prevention of the parties 
contesting the issues in a trial, and where the com-
plaint is si1nply that one party presented per-
jured testimony or false evidence. This charge is 
simply a continuation of the same dispute which 
the trial was supposed to resolve. It is the pur-
pose of the law to afford the parties full oppor-
tunity to have themselves and their witnesses 
present; and to present their evidence and their 
contentions to the court. When this has been done 
and the court has made its determination, that 
should end the matter, except for the right of 
appeal. It is so patent as to hardly justify com-
ment that a judgment should not be set side 
merely to grant the losing party another chance 
to accomplish the task at which he just failed; 
to prove that he was right and the opponent was 
wrong. To re-open a case just because a party 
persists in asserting and attempting to prove that 
his version of a dispute was the truth and that 
of the opponent was false would open the door to 
a repetition of ,~he procedure, whoever won the 
next time; and thus to keeping the dispute going 
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ad infinitum with no way of determining when 
the merry-go-round of the lawsuit would end." 
See also Wright v. W. E. Callahan Construction 
('o. ff al, 108 Utah 28, 156 P.2d 710, to like effect. 
In the above cases, the "fraud" relied upon was 
perjured testimony, or something similar. In the present 
case, no perjured testimony is involved, the claimed 
fraud being the failure of Lucy to disclose evidence 
which might tend to weaken her case. This is not extrinsic 
fraud. 
Burch v. The 1-Iibernia Bank et al., 146 Cal. App. 
~d 422, 304 P.2d 212, was an action for fraud and 
restoration of a leasehold, the plaintiff's rights having 
been adjudicated in a prior action brought by defendant 
bank. Plaintiff claimed the bank had misrepresented 
to plaintiff and the court the nature of its rights in the 
property, the existence of a U.S. District Court injunc-
tion affecting the bank's right to foreclose. The trial 
court ruled against plaintiff as a matter of law and the 
District Court of Appeals affirmed, saying: 
"The concealment of a party of evidence which, 
if disclosed, would tend to overthrow his case is 
not extrinsic fraud. Hogan v. Hogan, 131 Cal. 
App.2d 281, p. 284, 280 P .2d 64, at page 66, says: 
'It is settled in this State that a judgment will 
not be set aside because it is based upon perjured 
testimony or because material evidence is con-
cealed or suppressed, that such fraud both as to 
the court and the party against whom judgment 
is rendered is not fraud extrinsic to the record 
for which relief may be had.' 
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"***The allegations as to what (The Hiber-
nia Bank) did and did not do in that suit are in 
effect that the judgment was obtained by perjury, 
false evidence, and concealment of other evidence. 
The alleged concealment went to the merits of 
the cause submitted for judgment. If there was 
fraud it was intrinsic, not extrinsic (citing cases). 
The rule is the same whether the judgment sought 
to be set aside is a default judgment or rendered 
after answer and contested trial (citing cases).*** 
"The representations alleged to have been 
made to plaintiff by Hibernia prior to the quiet 
title suit as to its legal position, identical with its 
claim in the suit, do not constitute extrinsic fraud 
(citation) . Such alleged representations were 
merely that Hibernia had a superior title. They 
were exactly the same representations made to 
the court in the suit to quiet title. To be extrinsic 
the fraud must be collateral to the matter which 
was tried and determined by the court ( cita-
tions) . ***" 
A like holding is found in Pietro v. Pietro~ 147 Cal. 
App.2d 788, 305 P.2d 916, an action to set aside a 
divorce decree on the ground that it was obtained by 
fraud. One of the grounds relied upon was that the 
wife's attorney in the divorce case had retained two 
written agreements which prevented the plaintiff from 
proving ownership of property in dispute. The court 
held the complaint insufficient: 
"Plaintiff's first charge is that Madeline's at-
torney retained two written agreements which 
prevented him from proving his ownership of the 
property. Plaintiff could have forced the produc-
tion of these documents by subpoena duces tecum 
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directed to her counsel, or by an appropriate 
denmwl in open court. Conceahnent by a party oi:' 
e,·idence which, if disclosed, would tend to over-
throw this case, is not extrinsic fraud and there-
fore is not grounds for a suit to set aside a judg-
ment.'' 
Dr. Callister's state of mind at the time he trans-
ferred property was an issue directly involved in the 
previous case. Therefore, any fraud with respect to that 
state of Inind, either by perjury or concealment, would 
be intrinsic and not a basis for setting aside the judg-
ment unless the relationship between Vera and Lucy 
was such that there was a special duty of disclosure. 
III 
THERE WAS NO FIDUCIARY RELA-
TIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT WHICH PLACED UPON 
THE DEFENDANT A DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
TO THE PL.A.INTIFF EVIDENTIAL FACTS 
AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF THE 
PRIOR ACTION. 
Yera takes the position that because she asserted 
a claim against the estate (even though it was denied 
and has not been established by judgment) there arose 
a fiduciary relationship between her and Lucy which 
required Lucy to disclose to her everything Lucy knew 
that might aid her claim against Lucy as an individual-
regardless of how or in what capacity Lucy acquired 
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the knowledge. Neither history nor common sense sup-
ports the proposition. 
At common law a personal representative had no 
standing to bring an action to recover assets conveyed 
by a decedent in fraud of creditors. See 2 Bancroft's 
Probate Practice (2nd Edition) §47 4, wherein it is 
stated: 
"There is a clear distinction between an action 
attacking a conveyance or transfer on the ground 
of fraud or undue influence of the grantee or 
transferee, and an action to set asid~ a conveyance 
by the decedent as in fraud of creditors. Since the 
decedent could not himself take advantage of his 
own fraud, he would have no right of action in 
the latter instance were he alive. It is therefore 
an anomaly in the law if a right of action exists 
in the executor or administrator of the decedent 
after his death, and it is evident that, in the ab-
sence of statutory power~ no right of action could 
inure to the personal representative of the dece-
dent as such to sue to set aside the latter~ s con-
veyances in fraud of creditors~ although the credi-
tors might maintain an action for their own bene-
fit and in their own right. There is apparently 
nothing, however, to inhibit the legislature from 
making the executor or administrator the statu-
tory agent for the creditors for the purpose of 
bringing such action. As shown in the next sec-
tion, in fact, statutes now exist in most of the 
western states which expressly so empower and 
require the representative to act." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Utah has a statute under which a personal repre-
sentative must bring action in behalf of creditors if cer-
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tnin conditions are tnet. 75-11-1:J U.C.A. 1953. But the 
duty is limited by 75-11-1-J. U.C .. A. 1953, which provides 
that the personal representative need not bring suit 
except upon application of the. creditors who will pay 
the costs of the suit or put up such security as may be 
ordered by the court. 
\"era never did 1nake a demand upon the personal 
representative that suit be brought; neither did she offer 
to pay the expenses of such a suit; nor, as she might 
have done under the authority of Farnsworth et al. v. 
/latch, 41 Utah 0:.?, 151 Pac. 537, did she make an effort 
to have the executrix removed because of an obvious 
conflict of interest known to Vera and her counsel (R. 
5:? :4. 39, 45). Yet they now contend that Lucy should 
have acted in a manner that-as recognized in F arns-
tt•orth-interested parties cannot reasonably be expected 
to act: 
"In the nature of things, it is not J!Ossible for 
any one to act with perfect impartiality and fair-
ness in a matter which he claims valuable and 
itnportant interests. The fact is universally rec-
ognized, and especially in our courts of justice, 
and the only reason that it is not always strictly 
applied is because it is impractical to do so." 
This court has held that a creditor may not bring 
an action in his own name to set aside a conveyance by 
decedent without having made an unsuccessful demand 
on the personal representative to bring the action. Fehr-
inger r. Commercial ?\"'ational Bank of Ogden~ 23 Utah 
393, 64 Pac. 1108. On the other hand, it has been held 
that where the alleged fraudulent grantee is also the 
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personal representative the action may be brought by 
the creditors. 2 B ancroff s Probate Practice (2nd Ed.) 
§477. That is what Vera did in this case; but recognition 
of her right to sue is of necessity based upon a recogni-
tion that her interests are in conflict with Lucy's interests 
as executrix, and that it would be unrealistic to expect 
Lucy to protect Vera's claim. See Emmons v. Barton) 
109 Cal. 662, 42 Pac. 303, in which a creditor was per-
mitted to bring action against the grantee-executrix 
without prior demand, and in which, incidentally, the 
California Supreme Court held that statements of the 
deceased husband, made after the conveyance about title 
to the property, were erroneously admitted against the 
executrix. 
A case factually quite similar to the present one is 
Borge v. Traaen~ 158 Ore. 454, 75 P.2d 939, 76 P.2d 
1127, wherein a decedent, while indebted to the claimant, 
had conveyed to his wife through a third person certain 
North Dakota real property. The property was not 
listed in the probate inventory. After the estate was 
closed the claimant, holder of a note upon which ap-
proximately $3,000.00 was due, brought an action 
against the widow and erstwhile executrix to impress a 
trust upon proceeds obtained from sale of the North 
Dakota property, on the theory that the creditors had 
been defrauded by failure of the widow to disclose the 
transaction by which the property was conveyed to her. 
The court noted that the indebtedness had never 
been reduced to judgment, and that no claim had been 
presented to the administratrix. It held that an equitable 
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lien is not a,·ailable to a creditor until he has disclosed 
that the debtor is insolvent and, further, that "one of 
the tirst requisites in maintaining a creditor's bill is that 
the cre(litor has established his claim or debt by judg-
ment at law." It was held that before the claimant could 
I 
maintnin such suit he had to reduce his claim to judg-
ment. 
Comtnenting on the relationship between the claim-
ant and the personal representative, the Supreme Court 
of Oregon said: 
".:\ccording to the allegations of the complaint, 
the farn1land inN orth Dakota was not owned by 
Thomas Traaen at the time of his death. Neither 
it nor the contract for its sale was property which 
should have been listed or inventoried as a part of 
his estate. X o fraud, therefore, was committed by 
the adtninistratrix in omitting to list or inventory 
that land or the value of the contract for its sale. 
If Thomas Traaen was insolvent at the time he 
conveyed the property, and if he so conveyed or 
transferred it in order to hinder, delay, or defraud 
his creditors, the plaintiff could have brought pro-
ceedings against him during his lifetime, to have 
such conveyance declared void insofar as her claim 
against hi~ was concerned. Even though she had 
not brought such proceedings against him, she 
still, upon the approval of her claim by the admin-
istratrix or by the court, could have caused proper 
proceedings to be instituted by the administratrix 
under sections 11-633 and 11-634, supra, and if 
the administratrix had been a party to such con-
ve:rance~ she could have been removed and an-
other administrator appointed. Since the plaintiff 
did not follow either procedure, she is not now, 
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after her claim against the estate is barred by her 
failure to file it, in a position to maintain this suit. 
"The excuse given by the plaintiff ***for not 
presenting her claim to the probate court was that 
the inventory showed that the assets of the estate 
were only $7 50.00, and the fraud complained of 
is the failure of the administratrix to list among 
the assets of the estate the property owned by her 
which was fraudulently conveyed by Thomas 
Traaen. 
"Numerous authorities are cited by the appel-
lant to the effect that an heir of the decedent may, 
when the administrator or executor has fraudu-
lently concealed property which rightfully be-
longs to the heir, bring a suit in equity against 
such administrator or executor after the estate 
of the decedent has been closed. To the same 
effect, cases may be cited involving the failure 
of a guardian to account for property belonging 
to his ward. That such decisions are not here in 
point is too obvious to require discussion." 
The above case is important not because Lucy 
objects to the procedure chosen by Vera, but because it 
shows that technically Vera was not a creditor and, also 
technically, there was no fiduciary relationship. 
Assuming, for sake of argument, that there is a 
fiduciary relationship (for some purposes) between 
a claimant and an executrix, there is still the problem 
(suggested by cases cited under Point I) of circumscrib-
ing the duties of the executrix and determining the areas 
in which the "trust and confidence" may exist. 
That a fiduciary relationship may create duties only 
w:' h respect to particular property held by or particular 
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kinds of transactions entered into by the fiduciary was 
recognized by this court in In Re Blodgett's Estate, 93 
Utah l, 70 P.2d 742. One of the beneficiaries, ~Irs. 
Blodgett. eontended that a contract relating to distribu-
tion of the estate should be set aside because of the fail-
ure of l\lr. Crosby, co-heir and administrator, to make 
full disclosure. Mrs. Blodgett contended that she and 
Crosby occupied a fiduciary and confidential relationship 
and that Crosby had the burden of proving at least 
prima facie that he had not concealed information he was 
duty bound to disclose, nor suppressed property belong-
ing to the estate. Crosby contended that there was no 
actual relation of confidence because Mrs. Blodgett was 
distrustful of Crosby, had her own attorney and relied 
on him rather than on Crosby. The court said: 
"~Irs. Blodgett was a beneficiary or, perhaps 
to put it in a form to better suit appellant's coun-
sel, she had an interest in the estate. Likewise did 
Crosby. Crosby was also the administrator or 
manager of the estate in Utah. As administrator 
he had the duty to make full disclosure of all 
matters and information regarding the estate. 
It is not unlike a partnership where one partner 
manages the business. He must make full dis-
closure of his acts and the state of the business 
and render a correct accounting. But being the 
superior party in such case did not mean that he 
is under obligation to advise his partner in mat-
ters affecting a conflict of interests between them-
selves. As to external affairs of the estate, yes, 
but there is no obligation on the part of one heir 
7.cho is an administrator to either give advice or 
wisdom to a co-heir in matters where there is a 
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conflict or a controversy as to the extent or nature 
of their respective rights. His duty as administra-
tor went to the obligation to take into possession 
and disclose all estate property and all informa-
tion to those interested in the estate as to estate 
matters, thus putting them on the same plane 
as he was as to such information regarding all the 
assets and transactions, but, when that is done, 
he has performed his duty to a party in regard 
to whom he is in controversy as to their respective 
interests. In that relationship, after they are on 
an even plane as to all estate matters, she must 
exercise the decisions as to whether she will stand 
firm or recede in the controversy between them 
as to differences of opinion regarding their 
rights.*** 
''All we need to do is to determine if there were 
reasonable grounds for controversy and, if so, 
whether he furnished her full information as 
executor from which she could decide in their 
controversv as beneficiaries what she would or 
would no do. When he did this and she was fully 
informed and acted not on his advice, which he 
was not required to give, but on her own judg-
ment and on that of her attorney Styskal, he had 
no responsibility for her decisions.*** 
"We have attempted to draw the line of his 
duties. We do not need to indulge in phrases or 
applications of doctrines. Nor do we need to cite 
cases. The law is plain that he has his duty as 
trustee to her and as such it must be fully per-
formed. But, once performed, it does not extend 
into a field ·where trusteeship stops and adverse 
interest begins.,, (Emphasis added.) 
The court went on to decide that there was no such 
failure to disclose as would warrant invalidating the 
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agret·ment between the manager of the property for 
Utah and his co-heir, ~Irs. Blodgett. 
Our own situation is somewhat analogous. Not only 
was there no actual relationship of trust and confidence 
betwetll Vera and Lucy, there had been "bad blood" 
between the two women ever since Dr. Callister and 
r era were divorced, and, as indicated by Vera's counsel, 
one of the ideas behind settlement of the suit was "not 
to have two mean-mad women in court together at the 
same time at the same place" (R. 52:29). 
A principal similar to that announced in Blodgett 
was recognized by the Supreme Court of California in 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen_, 32 Cal.2d 13, 193 P.2d 728, in-
volving a property settlement between a husband and 
wife at the threshold of divorce. The wife, claiming that 
her husband had fraudulently concealed information or 
made misrepresentations as to the classification of prop-
erty which was community property, sought to vacate 
the settlement, relying upon a well-established Califor-
nia rule that one spouse has a fiduciary duty to disclose 
community assets to the other. 
In the fraud action the wife contended that certain 
corporate shares had been community property when 
the property settlement agreement was executed, but 
through the husband's fraud the property settlement 
agreement provided that the shares were his separate 
property. She contended that the part of the decree 
approving the agreement was induced by defendant's 
false representations and that, because of the relation-
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ship, the fraud was extrinsic, entitling her to equitable 
relief from the decree. The Supreme Court disagreed: 
"As manager of the community property the 
husband occupies a position of trust (Civil Code, 
§§172-173, 158), which is not terminated as to 
assets remaining in his hands when the spouses 
separate. It is part of his fiduciary duties to ac-
count to the wife for the community property 
when the spouses are negotiating a property 
settlement agreement. The concealment of com-
munity property assets by the husband from the 
wife in connection with such an agreement is 
therefore breach of a fiduciary duty of the hus-
band that deprives the wife of an opportunity 
to protect her rights in the concealed assets and 
thus warrants equitable relief from a judgment 
approving such agreement. *** The issue in the 
present case is whether under the facts stated in 
her amended complaint the wife was deprived of 
a fair opportunity to submit her case fully to the 
court because of a breach of a fiduciary duty of 
the husband. There is no allegation in the com-
plaint that defendant concealed assets that were 
part of the community property. The assets were 
disclosed, and the complaint is based on the theory 
that defendant fraudulently claimed certain com-
munity property as his separate estate. The clas-
sification of property as separate or community 
is frequently difficult. A husband at the time of 
divorce or separation is entitled to take a position 
favorable to his own interest in claiming as his 
separate property assets that a court might hold 
to be com1nunity property. Confronted with the 
assertion by the husband that certain a.Ysets are 
his separate property the wife must take her own 
position and if necessary investigate the facts.*** 
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If the ·wife and her attorney are satisfied with the 
husband's classification of the property as sep-
arate or comrnunif.tJ, the wife cannot reasonabLy 
contend that fraud was committed or that there 
teas such mistake as to allow her to overcome the 
finality of a ,judgment. In the present case plain-
tiff alleged that she and her attorney relied ex-
clusively on her husband's representations that 
the shares in question were his separate property 
and that her attorney made no examination or 
investigation to ascertain whether the shares were 
emnmunity property. She did not allege that her 
attorney intentionally failed to protect her inter-
ests. Plaintiff is barred from obtaining equitable 
relief by her admission that she and her attorney 
did not investigate the facts, choosing instead to 
rely on the statements of the husband as to what 
part of the disclosed property was community 
property." (Emphasis added.) 
In our case, too, the assets were disclosed and the 
dispute was as to whether property was conveyed with 
fraudulent intent or for other purposes. 
If Lucy had been removed as executrix, and Vera 
had established her claim at law, and a new personal 
representative had brought action against Lucy to re-
cover property conveyed by Dr. Callister during his 
lifetime, there would have been no fiduciary relationship 
between Lucy and the new personal representative, and 
no duty to disclose evidence which might tend to weaken 
Lucy's defense. The situation should be no different 
because 'r era decided to get a lawyer and enforce her 
claim for herself. 
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IV 
A PROCEEDING TO SET ASIDE A 
JUDGMENT AND RELEASE IS AN EQUI-
TABLE ACTION, AND THERE WERE TRI-
ABLE ISSUES OF FACT UPON WHICI-I 
THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO RELIEF 
WAS DEPENDENT. 
Proof of fraud requires "clear and convincing" evi-
dence of the various elements of fraud. Ferrell v. Wis-
well., 45 Utah 202, 143 Pac. 582. Vera was required to 
prove the representation or concealment of a material 
fact, its falsity or the fraudulent character of the con-
cealment, reliance, knowledge that the complaining 
party was relying upon the stated fact or non-existence 
of the concealed fact, and resulting damage. See In Re 
Madsen~s Estate~ 123 Utah 327, 259 P.2d 595, 606. 
Although Lucy had not disclosed to Vera that Dr. 
Callister had made the statement referred to in the affi-
davit to the Tax Commission, there is evidence from 
which it could be found that there was no reliance upon 
the failure to disclose and no damage because of the 
failure, that the statement by Dr. Callister was not 
material, and that Lucy had no intention to mislead 
Vera by not disclosing the fact. 
In light of the depositions taken in the two actions, 
Vera's affidavit is not sufficient to support a swnmary 
judgment. As pointed out by the United States Su-
preme Court in Sartor v. Arkansas National Gas Corp.} 
321 U.S. 620, 628, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967, 973, a 
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summary judgtnent should not be used to withdraw 
witnesses from cross examination, "the best method yet 
devised for testing trustworthiness of testimony. And 
their credibility and the weight to be given to their 
opinions is to be determined, after trial, in the regular 
manner." And, as said in Sonnentheil v. Christian Moer-
/ein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401, 408, 43 L.Ed. 492, 495, 
1~) S.Ct. t33, "the mere fact that the witness is interested 
in the result of the suit is deemed sufficient to require 
the credibility of his testimony to be submitted to the 
jury as a question of fact." 
~Ir. Beless admits that he knew of Lucy's affidavit 
to the Tax Commission in late March or early April, 
1963. But he took no prompt action to disaffirm the com-
promise and settlement. despite his knowledge that Lucy 
was involved in attempting to settle a tax claim the 
validity of which would depend upon an intention on 
Dr. Callister's part inconsistent with the intention 
averred by Vera to be true in her previous action against 
Lucy, and to be averred in her present one. Such 
conduct may estop Vera from obtaining rescission. See 
31 C.J .S., Estoppel, §98. Estoppel is a question of fact, 
and, the issue having been made known to the trial judge 
(R. 55), it should not have been determined by summary 
judgment. 
Related to estoppel is a rule that one who seeks 
to cancel an instrument on the ground of fraud must, 
upon learning of the fraud, immediately make his deci-
sion as to whether to stand on the agreement or renounce 
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it and must thereafter continue firm in that purpose. 
Taylor v. Moore et al.~ 87 Utah 493, 51 P.2d 222; Le-
Vine et al. v. Whitehouse et al.~ 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 
2; 12 C.J.S., Cancellation of Instruments~ §38, p. 999. 
The reasonableness of the delay and the timeliness 
of action to rescind are fact questions. See Union Pacific 
Railway Co. v. Whitney (8 Cir.) 198 Fed. 784; Graham 
v. Atchison Topeka ~ Santa Fe R. Co.~ (9 Cir.) 176 
F.2d 819; Brown v. Hassenstab~ 212 Or. 246, 319 P.2d 
929; Althoff v. St. Louis Transit Co.~ 204 Mo. 166, 102 
s.w. 642. 
Then there is the question of Vera's "clean hands" 
in negotiation of the settlement. Her counsel's letter of 
September 26, 1962, was sent (if he is to be believed) 
after he had come to the conclusion that Dr. Callister 
transferred the property without intent to defraud. Yet 
he suggested to Lucy that a settlement could be to her 
advantage because it would lead the tax authorities to 
believe that the transfers were made with the intention 
of defrauding {';;%r, rather than in contemplation of 
death. The main difference in what Mr. Beless suggested 
and what happened was that the amount paid to Vera 
was less than what he asked for. The letter of September 
26, 1962, was a sha1neless invitation to Lucy to commit 
fraud upon the government by trying to convince the 
government the facts were different from what they 
believed them to be. 8 
8 "Shameless" on their part-not on Lucy's. Lucy had conten~ed 
all along that she didn't know what Dr. Callister's "actu~l. m-
tent" was. This was still her attitude before the Tax Commission. 
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t:ndcr these circumstances a court of equity (as 
fact tinder. not via summary adjudication) could find 
that Vera did not con1e into the case with clean hands, 
nnd that Lucy did no more than what Vera had invited 
her to do, in which case relief would be denied. See 
Delgado v. Delgado, 42 N.M. 582, 82 P.2d 909; and 
:w C.J .S., Equity, §93. 
v 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RE-
IXSTATING 'l'HE PREVIOUS ACTION 
.\~D SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE 
PLAINTIFF TO INITIATE A NEW AC-
TION AGAINST THE ESTATE OF AL-
FRED CYRIL CALLISTER, DECEASED. 
It is generally held that in equitable actions to 
enjoin the enforcement of a judgment the relief is 
limited to prohibiting the party from enforcing the 
judgment, and that a court of equity may not order a 
new trial of the law action. Idaho Globe Dredging Corp. 
v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 60 Idaho 127, 90 P.2d 
688. This procedural rule is important in this case be-
cause of obligations imposed upon the plaintiff by 7 5-9-9 
U.C'.A. 1953, which provides that action on a rejected 
claim must be brought within three months after the 
filing of the notice of rejection. 
'V e recognize that the period within which the 
claimant would be entitled to bring her action frequently 
would be affected by existence of the action which was 
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dismissed with prejudice, and that Lucy might not be 
permitted to contend that the limitation period expired 
while the other case was pending. lVe do believe, how-
ever, on authority of Free v. Farnsworth et al.~ 112 Utah 
410, 188 Pac. 731, that when Vera went into equity 
to prevent the enforcement of the judgment she im-
pliedly consented that if the judgment was improperly 
granted, Lucy should not be placed at a disadvantage 
by reason of the delay. 
Here there was a delay after Vera learned all the 
facts-or was charged with knowledge of them-in late 
March or early April, 1963. She failed to take any action 
with respect to the judgment for a period in excess of 
the limitation period prescribed by 75-9-9. 
Her obligation to bring the revived action within 
the time specified by statute is a matter that should be 
considered by the trial court, but which probably cannot 
be considered because of the character of the trial court's 
order. Even if Vera may be able to establish some reasons 
why the limitation would not apply, it is a matter upon 
which Lucy ought to be heard. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, notwithstanding personal ill-will, reli-
ance upon counsel's professional judgment, arm's length 
dealings, and access to court processes for determination 
of facts, the trial court has ruled as a matter of law that 
an executrix even though sued in her individual capacity 
for conduct antedating the death of her testator, has a 
46 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
duty voluntarily to disclose to her adversary any evi-
dence which tnight, if admitted at the trial, tend to pre-
judice the executrix's defense, and that the duty encom-
pnsses disclosure of confidential communications between 
husband and wife. 
~loreover, the trial court made this "rnatter of law" 
ruling notwithstanding the existence of the following 
problems: 
(1} "\pplication of the doctrine of clean hands. 
(:!) ,~era's admission that she relied on her counsel 
and her counsel's admission that he recommended settle-
ment upon his professional judgment as to difficulties 
of proof. and so that "two mean-mad women" wouldn't 
be in court at the same time and the same place. 
( 3) Failure of Vera and her counsel to seek rescis-
sion notwithstanding knowledge of the affidavit, and 
knowledge that the Tax Commission and Lucy were 
trying to settle the tax issue. 
( 4) The "undisclosed facts" were evidential only, 
and related to an ultimate fact that was at issue in the 
first action.itt iliSiiSue in tlli lawsait. 
( 5) Y era had not qualified as a creditor either by 
haYing her claim allowed or by reducing it to judgment. 
(6) Vera had renounced any confidential relation-
ship between her and Lucy by employing counsel and 
bringing an action in which she alleged that Lucy was 
a part of a fraudulent scheme and had received trans-
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fers of property to aid and abet Dr. Callister in defraud-
ing her. 
In the final analysis, the history of the first action 
belies Vera's claim in the second. Although she says 
(R. 3) she was induced to execute the stipulation and 
release because of her reliance on Lucy's representations, 
the question of the "actual intent" of Dr. Callister had 
been decided against her in the pre-trial order; and she 
didn't even begin to negotiate for settlement until her 
chance of winning the suit had all but evaporated. 
It's almost as reasonable to suppose that she anti-
cipated the tax controversy and settled to mark time 
while her adversary developed evidence for her. 
There was no fraud nor fraudulent concealment-
and there is no right to relief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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Mr. Bryce Roe 
APPENDIX ''A'' 
James W. Beless, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
914 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
September 26, 1962 
~ Attorney at Law 
!: Continental Bank Building 
I Salt Lake City, Utah 
Re: Vera T. Callister v. 
Lucy C. Callister, et al 
Dear Bry: 
I have done a little figuring on death taxes in A. C. Callister's 
estate, using the $202,000 taxable estate for both the Federal Estate 
Tax and the State Inheritance Tax. You might have Ralph Miller check 
~ me out on these. 
With the stocks included in the $202,000 as gifts in contemplation 
of death, and using the full marital deduction, I compute a Federal 
T.tx of S 15,100. Likewise, in computing the State Inheritance Tax, 
with $40,000 deduction for the joint tenancy property, I compute a 
tax of $9,250. Thus, total death taxes of $24,350.00. 
~ If the stocks are not included in the taxable estate, the Federal 
~l taxable estate would be $105,000, and there would be no Federal 
1
:. Estate Tax, using the marital deduction. The State Inheritance Tax 
:'- would be $1,250.00. 
The savings in death taxes, if the stocks are not included as 
,,: gifts in contemplation of death, this amounts to $23,100. 
It would appear to me that Mrs. Lucy Callister should seriously 
consider this tJx saving, as she would save the difference between 
what she would pay Vera Callister and $23,100.00. 
Very truly yours, 
JWB;b 
James W. Beless, Jr. 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX "B" 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
LUCY CALLISTER, after being placed on oath, deposes and says: 
That she is the widow of Dr. A. Cyril Callister, who died on the 
9th day of February, 1961. 
That during the period of time from March through November 
of 1959, Dr. Callister transferred certain stocks from his name to the 
dt!!.f:'•'tr:r~,. 1s dependeqf s name which stocks were listed on the inheritance tax 
report and appraisment under the title "Transfers made within three 
years of date of death"; 
That her husband told her that the transfers were made for the 
purpose of removing these stocks from his name and placing them 
beyond access of his former wife, Vera Callister, to whom the doctor 
owed certain monies for arrearages in an alimony judgment which she 
had against him; 
That the doctor was very bitter about having to pay this alimony 
because he felt that his former wife had received more than her fair 
share of the property upon their divorce; 
That the doctor considered himself to be in good health at least 
until June of 1960 and that he maintained his clinic, and a nurse 
until about this time and engaged in the practice of medicine; 
And that on or about June of 1960 he retired from the medical 
practice and converted the clinic into a nursing home. 
Lucy Callister 
Subscribed and sworn to this 30th day of December, 1962. 
Ralph H. Miller 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My commission expires: 3-22-64. 
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